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ABSTRACT
In response to investors and other stakeholders questioning the credibility of the performance
information displayed in sustainability reports, companies increasingly have their sustainability
reports voluntarily assured by an independent third party. However, voluntary third-party assur-
ance on sustainability reports (SA) may vary considerably in terms of the choice of the assurance
provider as well as the scope and level of assurance. In this study, the relationship between cor-
porate sustainability performance (CSP) and choices related to SA is explored.
Using a panel data set of 4686 listed companies (from 21 European and North American coun-
tries) during the period 2009–2014, the results indicate that companies with a superior CSP are
more likely to employ third parties to provide assurance on their sustainability reports than com-
panies with an inferior sustainability performance. For companies that employ third parties to
provide assurance, we also ﬁnd that, among the companies headquartered in the more
shareholder-oriented countries, CSP plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining variation in the choice
of the assurance provider, while predominantly in the more stakeholder-oriented countries, com-
panies with a good CSP are more likely to choose a broader assurance scope than companies with
a poor CSP. The results support the notion that companies with a superior CSP make different
choices related to SA than companies with an inferior CSP. The results also indicate that
country-speciﬁc characteristics are important for understanding the variation in choices related
to SA. We discuss the ﬁndings and their implications. © 2017 The Authors. Corporate Social Respon-
sibility and Environmental Management published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Introduction
IN THIS STUDY, WE INVESTIGATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE (CSP) AND CHOICES RELATED TOvoluntary third-party assurance on sustainability reports. Investors and other stakeholders are increasingly urg-ing companies to become more responsible and accountable for the impacts of their decisions and activities onthe environment and society, and to publish information on sustainability performance in sustainability or cor-
porate social responsibility reports. At the same time, however, they also question the credibility and reliability of the
performance information disclosed in these sustainability reports. In response to concerns relating to the credibility
of the sustainability information disclosed, there has been a growing tendency for companies to have their sustain-
ability reports voluntarily assured by an independent third party (Junior et al., 2014; KPMG, 2015). Voluntary inde-
pendent third-party assurance on corporate sustainability reports (SA) can help improve stakeholders’ conﬁdence in
the credibility of the sustainability information provided and thus enhance the corporate reputation (Simnett et al.,
2009; Pﬂugrath et al., 2011; Reimsbach et al., 2017). In addition, the process of independent assurance may induce
companies to improve their risk management and accounting information systems to produce and disclose more
reliable and accurate sustainability information, and strengthen companies’ commitment to sustainability (Fonseca,
2010; GRI, 2013; Junior et al., 2014; Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016; Braam et al., 2016; García-
Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2016). Furthermore, improved reporting processes and the disclosure of higher qual-
ity sustainability information may drive sustainable value creation, which might positively inﬂuence companies’
competitive position (Lozano & Huisingh, 2011; Marín et al., 2012; Lozano, 2015).
However, in the absence of regulation of sustainability reporting and assurance on sustainability reports, man-
agers voluntarily decide whether or not to employ independent third parties to provide assurance on their compa-
nies’ sustainability reports. Furthermore, for companies whose sustainability reports are assured by an
independent third party, SA may vary considerably in terms of the choice of the assurance provider, as well as
the scope, ranging from an assurance provided over the entire report to assurance provided over a speciﬁc section
of the report, and the level of assurance, ranging from reasonable assurance to limited assurance. These
assurance-related managerial decisions may be inﬂuenced by the CSP of the reporting ﬁrms. On the one hand,
companies with a superior CSP may voluntarily employ third-party assurance to signal that the sustainability in-
formation is fairly presented, in all material respects. Here, the marginal beneﬁts of SA are likely to outweigh
the marginal costs. SA signals the credibility of their CSP disclosures and enhances conﬁdence in the accuracy
and reliability of the information disclosed. On the other hand, however, voluntary third-party assurance may also
be beneﬁcial for companies with an inferior CSP that are subject to public pressures and legitimacy threats. Due
to managerial capture, which refers to management’s control of the sustainability reporting and processes for SA
(O’Dwyer, 2003; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Smith et al., 2011), management can strategically use its control and
discretion to not only deﬁne what CSP information to disclose but also whether to voluntarily assure the CSP in-
formation in their sustainability reports. To deﬂect attention from bad sustainability performance, in particular in
companies with an inferior CSP, the management may self-servingly prefer to selectively disclose mostly good
CSP in sustainability reports, rather than reveal the company’s good and bad CSP in a balanced report (Cho
et al., 2012; Boiral, 2013). In this case, the company’s management may utilize SA as a tool to proactively manage
investors’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions of the credibility of the CSP information revealed in the company’s
sustainability reports, rather than employ a third party to assure that the CSP information is not materially
misstated (Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2012; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Hahn & Lülfs, 2014;
Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016; Odriozola & Baraibar-Diez, 2017). In addition, they may also selectively choose the assur-
ance provider, as well as the scope and level of assurance to enhance perceived legitimacy and corporate reputa-
tion. Thus, we expect that managers of companies with a superior CSP make different choices related to SA
than managers of companies with an inferior CSP.
This study aims to contribute to the understanding of the variety in managers’ choices regarding SA practices by
exploring the relationship between CSP and choices related to third-party assurance on sustainability reports. For
this reason, a distinction is made between companies that issue sustainability reports with and without third-party
assurance. For those companies whose sustainability reports are assured, we further analyze the choice of the assur-
ance provider, the scope of assurance, and the level of assurance. Using a sample of listed companies, comprising
4686 observations covering the period 2009–2014 for European and North American countries that we, consistent
165Sustainability Performance and Assurance on Sustainability Reports
© 2017 The Authors. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 25, 164–181 (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/csr
with prior literature, distinguish in more shareholder and more stakeholder-oriented countries, the results indicate
that companies with a superior CSP are more likely to employ independent third parties to provide assurance on the
corporate sustainability reports than companies with an inferior sustainability performance. For those companies
that acquire assurance, the results also indicate that, among the companies headquartered in the more
shareholder-oriented countries, companies with a superior CSP are more likely to choose an assurance provider
from the auditing profession than companies with an inferior CSP. Predominantly in the more stakeholder-oriented
countries, companies with a good CSP are more likely to choose a broader assurance scope than companies with a
poor CSP. These ﬁndings support our expectation that managers of companies with a superior CSP make different
choices related to SA than managers of companies with an inferior CSP. The ﬁndings also indicate that country-
speciﬁc characteristics are important for understanding of the variation in choices related to SA.
This paper contributes to the ongoing research related to SA in four ways. First, this study is among the ﬁrst to
systematically explore the relation between CSP and managerial choices related to third-party assurance on sustain-
ability reports. Second, in addition to studies that investigate factors associated with the choice of the assurance pro-
vider for companies whose sustainability reports are assured (Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009; Pﬂugrath
et al., 2011; Moroney et al., 2012; Casey & Grenier, 2015; Clarkson et al., 2015; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2015), this
study adds CSP to explain variety in the type of assurance provider. Third, we also explore the role of CSP in
explaining variations in managerial choices related to the scope and the level of SA (Hodge et al., 2009). Fourth, this
study complements the literature on assurance on sustainability reports on country-related factors associated with
the decision to purchase SA assurance. Previous studies show that companies headquartered in stakeholder-
oriented countries are more likely to employ independent third parties to provide assurance on their sustainability
reports than companies headquartered in shareholder-oriented countries (Simnett et al., 2009; Kolk & Perego,
2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Casey Grenier, 2015). In this study, we also explore whether the relationship between
CSP and choices related to the assurance provider, and the scope and level of assurance differs between companies
headquartered in more stakeholder oriented vs more shareholder oriented countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on the relationship between
CSP and choices related to third-party assurance on sustainability reports, and then we develop hypotheses. Next, we
describe the research method, followed by a presentation of the results. Finally, we summarize our conclusions and
discuss the implications of the ﬁndings.
Theoretical Background and Development of Hypotheses
Signaling theory and legitimacy theory provide partly competing explanations on why companies with a greater need
to increase stakeholder conﬁdence in their sustainability reports are more likely to voluntarily have their sustainabil-
ity reports assured by an independent third party (Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009; Hummel & Schlick,
2016).
Signaling theory suggests that companies with a superior CSP voluntarily employ independent third parties to
provide assurance to signal their superior sustainability performance, given that the expected marginal beneﬁts out-
weigh the assurance costs. Independent assurance on sustainability reports, and in particular on the CSP informa-
tion disclosed, may increase stakeholders’ conﬁdence in companies’ integrity regarding their accountability for their
CSP, thus enhancing their corporate reputation (Simnett et al., 2009; Hahn & Kühnen, 2013; Casey & Grenier,
2015). Enhanced stakeholder conﬁdence in the credibility of the CSP information disclosed may also result in com-
petitive advantages, such as better access to ﬁnance (Cheng et al., 2014), a reduced cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal
et al., 2011), increased analyst coverage, lower analyst forecast errors and dispersion, a reduction of monitoring costs
(Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Casey & Grenier, 2015), and higher future cash ﬂows (Lys et al., 2015; Plumlee et al., 2015).
Legitimacy theory, in contrast, predicts that the companies subject to public pressure and legitimacy threats due
to poor sustainability performance may also employ third parties to provide assurance. Due to managerial capture,
voluntary disclosure of CSP may be selective and self-serving. The management of companies with an inferior CSP
may prefer to signal good CSP, rather than release bad CSP (Cho et al., 2012; Boiral, 2013). To mask bad perfor-
mance, they may proactively employ third parties to provide assurance on the CSP information revealed. They
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may use third-party assurance as a risk management tool to actively manage investors’ and other stakeholders’ per-
ceptions of the credibility of the CSP information disclosed. Thus, independent third-party assurance helps to de-
ﬂect attention from bad sustainability performance, reduce legitimacy risks, confer greater conﬁdence among
stakeholders, and prevent interventions (Freedman & Patten, 2004; Unerman, 2008; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Perego
& Kolk, 2012; Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016).
However, third-party assurance is a costly process. According to economics-based theory, companies will trade
off the relative costs and beneﬁts of assurance on sustainability reports and employ third parties only if the expected
beneﬁts outweigh the costs (Verrecchia, 1983; Fonseca, 2010; Lys et al., 2015). The present study posits that the ex-
pected net beneﬁts from employing third-party assurance on sustainability reporting are likely to be higher for com-
panies with a superior CSP than for those with a poor CSP. Independent third-party assurance aims to ensure that
the CSP information disclosed in sustainability reports is, in all material respects, reliable and accurate, and in com-
pliance with reporting standards. For this reason, the information disclosed must be veriﬁable. For superior per-
formers, third-party assurance is an effective signal to positively differentiate themselves. At the same time, the
management of companies with a superior CSP, on average, might be more experienced with the process of sustain-
ability reporting and more conﬁdent in their reporting quality (e.g. data quality, accuracy) relative to those from com-
panies with an inferior performance. For the management of companies that lag behind, the process of external
assurance might be more time consuming and costly, but it might also be more uncertain whether they would ‘sur-
vive’ the assurance process without issues.1 In addition, monitoring compliance with reporting standards makes it
more difﬁcult to manage and mask bad CSP. CSP disclosure in compliance with standards may increase the likeli-
hood that stakeholders detect that the company’s CSP is inferior, which may reduce the company’s legitimacy and
stakeholder trust, damage the company’s reputation, and increase the likelihood of outside intervention. Thus,
Hypothesis 1. Companies with a superior CSP are more likely to have their sustainability reports assured by a third
party than companies with an inferior CSP.
In a voluntary disclosure setting, signaling theory also predicts that the companies with a superior CSP will signal
information regarding choices related to voluntary third-party assurance that is hard for companies with an inferior
CSP to imitate (Clarkson et al., 2008; Connelly et al., 2011; Pﬂugrath et al., 2011). More speciﬁcally, to distinguish
themselves from inferior performers, companies with a superior CSP are expected to make different choices related
to the choice of the assurance provider, the scope of assurance, and the level of assurance than companies with an
inferior CSP. For the choice of the assurance provider, consistent with the previous literature, this study makes a
distinction between assurance providers from the auditing profession and other assurance providers, such as sus-
tainability or environmental consultancies.
Prior literature argues that assurance provided by accounting ﬁrms is of a different quality than that provided by
specialist consultants (Simnett et al., 2009; Hodge et al., 2009; Pﬂugrath et al., 2011).2 Empirical evidence is mixed
(Pﬂugrath et al., 2011; Moroney et al., 2012; Casey & Grenier, 2015). However, some studies, including Simnett et al.
(2009), also indicate that, on average, assurance providers from the accounting profession are more expensive than
other assurance providers. Consistent with literature that argues that that fees can be a proxy of the level of audit
effort (Chaney et al., 2004; Hoitash et al., 2007), assurance providers from the auditing profession, on average, sig-
nal higher levels of audit effort on sustainability reports than the other assurance providers, and for this reason dif-
ferently affect stakeholders’ perceptions of the credibility of the information revealed in sustainability reports. The
scope of the third-party assurance engagement can range from assurance on information disclosed in speciﬁc sec-
tions of the report to assurance provided for the entire sustainability report. Regarding the level of assurance, a
1We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing up this aspect.
2The auditing profession has experience and developed auditing standards, a body of ethics, independence and ethical requirements, and quality
control mechanisms to provide high quality independent assurance. Accounting ﬁrms also have a reputation on which they rely on for the con-
tinuation of their business. For these reasons, some literature argues that assurance provided by accounting ﬁrms is of a higher quality than that
provided by specialist consultants (Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009; Pﬂugrath et al., 2011; Zorio et al., 2013). A counter argument, how-
ever, is that non-auditing assurance providers, such as environmental or sustainability consultancies may possess an increased specialized exper-
tise (Perego, 2009; Wong & Millington, 2014) and have a different focus (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005, 2007). Assurance providers in the auditing
profession, however, can buy this specialized knowledge (Simnett et al., 2009; Casey & Grenier, 2015).
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distinction is made between limited (negative) assurance and reasonable (positive) assurance (CorporateRegister,
2008; Hodge et al., 2009; GRI, 2013). A broader assurance scope and a higher level of assurance are expected to
result in a higher quality of independent assurance, since they will result in more scrutiny.
Contingent on a cost–beneﬁt trade-off, companies with a superior CSP are more likely to employ assurance pro-
viders from the accounting profession, and choose a broader assurance scope as well as a higher level of assurance
(reasonable assurance) to distinguish themselves from the inferior performers. These ‘high quality assurance op-
tions’ that are difﬁcult for inferior performers to replicate help superior performers to enhance stakeholder conﬁ-
dence in corporate sustainability reporting practices and the stakeholders’ perceptions of the credibility of the
CSP information disclosed (Hodge et al., 2009).
Legitimacy theory, however, predicts that the companies with an inferior CSP may also beneﬁt from third-party
assurance. More speciﬁcally, these companies selectively and proactively employ third parties that provide assurance
to signal that the disclosed information is credible. Selective assurance may signal that the CSP information released
in sustainability reports is credible and reliable. Proactively signaling the credibility of the CSP information
disclosed assists company management in inﬂuencing stakeholders’ perceptions and may generate greater stake-
holders’ conﬁdence in the level of responsibility taken in relation to sustainable development, thus enhancing cor-
porate reputation and perceived legitimacy (Cho & Patten, 2007; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Luo et al., 2012; Cho et al.,
2012; Hahn & Lülfs, 2014; Odriozola & Baraibar-Diez, 2017). For these reasons, inferior sustainability performers
self-servingly use third-party assurance as a risk management tool to deﬂect attention from poor CSP and reduce its
negative effects on corporate legitimacy (Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016). However, because they must comply with the
reporting standards, these companies prefer the ‘low quality assurance options’ with less scrutiny, so they have
more room to decouple their revealed CSP from their actual, true CSP. These companies are less likely to employ
assurance providers from the auditing profession and are more likely to choose limited assurance on speciﬁc sec-
tions of the ﬁrms’ sustainability report. Thus,
Hypothesis 2. Companies with a superior CSP are more likely to have their sustainability reports assured by a provider
from the accounting profession than companies with an inferior CSP.
Hypothesis 3. Companies with a superior CSP are more likely to choose a broader scope of third-party assurance than
companies with an inferior CSP.
Hypothesis 4. Companies with a superior CSP are more likely to choose a higher level of third-party assurance than
companies with an inferior CSP.
In addition, the literature suggests that the institutional environment, legal enforcement, and the culture of a
country, and in particular whether a country is more stakeholder- or shareholder-oriented, can inﬂuence ﬁrms’
choices related to SA (La Porta et al., 2000; Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005, 2010; Simnett et al., 2009; Dhaliwal
et al., 2014). In more stakeholder-oriented countries, stakeholders such as customers, employees, communities,
and the natural environment, are considered to possess a legitimate interest in corporate activities, and therefore
have more inﬂuence on companies’ business operations, compared with the stakeholder groups in more
shareholder-oriented countries who ‘have less legitimacy and therefore less inﬂuence on corporate activities’
(Simnett et al., 2009: 944). In the stakeholder-oriented countries, organizations are more likely to be managed
in the interests of all their constituents, i.e., all stakeholders who can affect and/or are affected by the achieve-
ment of an organization’s objectives (Freeman, 1984; Gray et al., 1995), and not only in the interest of share-
holders with a focus on the creation of shareholder value (Laplume et al., 2008). In the more stakeholder-
oriented countries, there is more emphasis on sustainable value creation and a greater need to increase the con-
ﬁdence of stakeholders in the credibility of sustainability reports to monitor and evaluate ﬁrms, and companies
will be more responsive to the information demands of the stakeholder groups than in the less shareholder-
oriented countries (Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Perego & Kolk, 2012). For this reason,
we expect that a country’s stakeholder orientation moderates the hypothesized relations between CSP and choices
related to SA, i.e., the SA-related choices will be more pronounced in stakeholder-oriented countries than in
shareholder-oriented countries.
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Research Method
Sample
To test the hypotheses, we used a sample of 4686 ﬁrm-year observations of publicly traded ﬁrms in 19 European
and 2 North American countries during the years 2009–2014. For the 19 European countries, we used the top
100 publicly listed companies included in the KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (2015), which
were selected based on their revenues at the end of 2014. For the United States (USA) and Canada, we also included
the 100 largest publicly listed companies per country as measured by revenues at the end of 2014. For inclusion in
the sample, all ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial information had to be available. The ﬁnancial information was extracted
from the Datastream database (www.thomsonone.com). The data on sustainability reporting was retrieved from the
Sustainability Disclosure Database from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (http://database.globalreporting.org).
If information was not available in this database, then the sustainability reports were retrieved from the companies’
websites to gather the missing information. To measure CSP, we used data with the environmental, social and gov-
ernance (ESG) scores retrieved from Thomson Reuters ASSET4. Thomson Reuters ASSET4, which is incorporated
in Datastream, specializes in providing objective, veriﬁable, and comparable ESG data with global coverage. After we
omitted the missing observations, the remaining unbalanced panel data set included data for 835 publicly listed
companies, comprising 4686 ﬁrm-year observations (3644 observations of 656 European companies and 1042 ob-
servations of 179 North American companies).
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for these sample companies. Panel A shows the distribution of the sam-
ple companies across countries, while Panel B shows the distribution across more shareholder vs. more stakeholder-
oriented countries. European countries excluding the UK and Ireland are considered more stakeholder-oriented,
whereas the North American countries and the UK and Ireland have a higher shareholder orientation (Simnett
et al., 2009; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Perego & Kolk, 2012). Panel C illustrates the growing tendency for companies
to have their sustainability reports assured by an independent third party (KPMG, 2015; Junior et al., 2014).
Variables
Dependent Variables
To test our hypotheses, we used four dependent variables. First, we created a dummy variable SA, taking the value of
1 if a company’s sustainability report was assured by an independent third party, and a value of 0 otherwise. Second,
for the subsample of companies that employed third parties to provide assurance, we used the variable Assurance
provider that takes the value of 1 if the assurance provider is a member of the auditing profession, and 0 if the as-
surance is not provided by a member of the auditing profession (Simnett et al., 2009). Third, the dependent variable
Scope is equal to 1 if the scope of the independent assurance provided covers the entire sustainability report, and 0
otherwise. Finally, the dummy variable Level takes the value of 1 if reasonable (positive) assurance was provided for
the sustainability report, and 0 in the case of limited (negative) assurance.
Independent Variables
To assess companies’ level of CSP, we used the ESG dataset from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 with objective and au-
ditable data on ﬁrm environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) with a comprehensive global coverage.
Following previous studies (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Cheng et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2015; Qiu et al., 2016), we used
the ASSET4 environmental and social scores to construct a composite CSP score for each ﬁrm.3 For each sample
ﬁrm, we calculated its CSP score as the sum of the performance scores for the environmental and social dimension
divided by two, thus assigning equal importance to each pillar (Waddock & Graves, 1997). To account for industry
3The environmental and social scores for measuring CSP cover a broad set of indicators of environmental and social performance. The environ-
mental score includes measures of emissions, waste, water and energy consumption, the amount of investment in sustainability (i.e., innovations
beneﬁting the environment), etc. The social score comprises measures of employee rights, diversity, employee training hours, health, workforce
accidents, personnel turnover, and product responsibility. The company scores per pillar are relative measures of performance that range from 0
to 100%, with a higher score indicating a better environmental or social performance. The scores are relative measures of performance that are
calculated by equally weighing and z-scoring all underlying data points and benchmarking the companies’ performance scores against the other
companies with ESG data.
169Sustainability Performance and Assurance on Sustainability Reports
© 2017 The Authors. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 25, 164–181 (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/csr
Panel A: Company characteristics across country
Country Firm-year
observations
Sustainability
report issued
Third-party
Assurance (SA)
Assurance provider:
Auditing profession3
Scope: assurance on
entire sustainabi-lity
report4
Level of assurance:
Reasonable assurance5
n n in % n in % n in % n in % n in %
Belgium 150 94 63% 34 36% 28 82% 4 12% 0 0%
Czech Republic 18 17 94% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Denmark 148 128 86% 41 32% 34 83% 4 10% 1 2%
Finland 144 123 85% 68 55% 51 75% 52 76% 0 0%
France 422 317 75% 210 66% 205 98% 14 7% 14 7%
Germany 344 222 65% 124 56% 107 86% 19 15% 0 0%
Greece 98 68 69% 40 59% 31 78% 6 15% 0 0%
Hungary 23 23 100% 18 78% 13 72% 8 44% 0 0%
Ireland1 76 11 14% 3 27% 3 100% 3 100% 0 0%
Italy 257 175 68% 130 74% 112 86% 71 55% 0 0%
Netherlands 184 127 69% 91 72% 83 91% 21 23% 14 15%
Norway 108 61 56% 34 56% 32 94% 4 12% 2 6%
Poland 131 47 36% 20 43% 16 80% 7 35% 0 0%
Portugal 64 33 52% 23 70% 22 96% 7 30% 2 9%
Russia 144 97 67% 36 37% 15 42% 15 42% 14 39%
Spain 233 185 79% 145 78% 116 80% 57 39% 15 10%
Sweden 237 183 77% 78 43% 71 91% 46 59% 5 6%
Switzerland 312 182 58% 59 32% 30 51% 19 32% 5 8%
UK1 551 448 81% 211 47% 131 62% 45 21% 5 2%
Europe 3644 2541 70% 1365 54% 1100 81% 402 29% 77 6%
Canada2 530 276 52% 72 26% 59 82% 5 7% 0 0%
USA2 512 337 66% 77 23% 35 45% 11 14% 16 21%
North America 1042 613 59% 149 24% 94 63% 16 11% 16 11%
Total 4686 3154 1514 48% 1194 79% 418 28% 93 6%
Panel B: Country orientation: more stakeholder vs. more shareholder orientation
Country-orientation Firm-year
observations
Sustainability
report issued
Third-party
Assurance
Assurance
provider:
Auditing
profession3
Scope:
assurance
on entire
sustainabi-
lity report4
Level of
assurance:
Reasonable
assurance5
n n in % n in % n in
%
n in
%
n in %
Stakeholder orientation
Firms headquartered in European
countries1
3017 2082 69% 1151 55% 966 84% 354 31% 72 6%
3017 2082 69% 1151 55% 966 84% 354 31% 72 6%
Shareholder orientation
Firms headquartered in European
countries1
627 459 73% 214 47% 134 63% 48 22% 5 2%
Firms headquartered in countries in
North America2
1042 613 59% 149 24% 94 63% 16 11% 16 11%
1669 1072 64% 363 34% 228 63% 64 18% 21 6%
Total 4686 3154 67% 1514 48% 1194 79% 418 28% 93 6%
170 G. Braam and R. Peeters
© 2017 The Authors. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 25, 164–181 (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/csr
competition, consistent with Luo et al. (2015), we used the ratio of a ﬁrm’s CSP score to the average CSP score of all
competing ﬁrms in the industry as deﬁned by the categorization of industries on the basis two-digit Standard Indus-
trial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes as the ﬁnal measure of CSP in our analysis. A higher CSP score indicates a better
corporate sustainability performance, and suggests that a company is more likely to accept greater responsibility
for sustainable development.4
At the country level, consistent with Simnett et al. (2009), a dummy variable Stakeholder orientation was added
that is coded as 1 if a company is headquartered in a stakeholder-oriented country, and 0 if a company is
headquartered in a shareholder-oriented country. Common law countries are considered more shareholder-oriented
and code law countries to be more stakeholder-oriented (La Porta et al., 1997, 2000).
Control Variables
Because we have repeated measurements at the ﬁrm level that are nested within countries, we included several con-
trol variables at the ﬁrm, industry and country level, and added random effects at the ﬁrm level and year dummies to
control for time effects. At the ﬁrm level, consistent with previous literature (Simnett et al., 2009; Moroney et al.,
2012; Sierra et al., 2013; Casey & Grenier, 2015), the natural log of total assets (Lnsize), the return on assets
(ROA), and leverage (Leverage) were included as control variables. To control for sector-speciﬁc effects, we distin-
guished between companies that were or were not classiﬁed as environmentally or socially sensitive industries (In-
dustry). Consistent with Patten (2002) and Simnett et al. (2009), ﬁrms in the petroleum, chemical excluding
pharmaceutical, metals, and paper industries were classiﬁed as environmentally sensitive industries, while ﬁrms
in the ﬁnance industry were categorized as socially sensitive industries.5 At the country level, we took the rule of
4To test the robustness of the results, we also computed a dummy variable CSP that is coded as 1 if the CSP score of ﬁrm i in year t was high, and
0 if the CSP score was low. The CSP score for ﬁrm i in year t was high if this score was above the industry median, and 0 otherwise. The results of
the additional tests show that different measures of CSP do not change the results qualitatively, suggesting that the results are robust to different
measures of CSP.
5The results of the additional tests that control for industry differences based on a categorization of industries with the use of the two-digit SIC
codes show that the results are robust to different industry controls.
Panel C: Company characteristics across year
Year Firm-year
observations
Sustainability
reports issued
Third-party
Assurance
Assurance provider:
Auditing profession3
Scope: Assurance on
entire sustainability
report4
Level of assurance:
reasonable
assurance5
n n in % n in % n in % n in % n in %
2009 706 384 54% 162 42% 121 75% 21 13% 2 1%
2010 763 466 61% 195 42% 141 72% 32 16% 10 5%
2011 783 519 66% 241 46% 184 76% 72 30% 17 7%
2012 796 550 69% 269 49% 216 80% 97 36% 21 8%
2013 815 599 73% 312 52% 256 82% 104 33% 20 6%
2014 823 636 77% 335 53% 276 82% 92 27% 23 7%
Total 4686 3154 67% 1514 48% 1194 79% 418 28% 93 6%
Table 1. Summary statistics of sample companies (2009–2014)
1Within Europe, the UK and Ireland are classiﬁed as shareholder-oriented countries. The other European countries are classiﬁed as
stakeholder-oriented countries.
2The USA and Canada are classiﬁed as shareholder-oriented countries.
3Firms that choose a third-party assurance provider from the auditing profession in numbers and as a percentage of the ﬁrms that have
assurance on their sustainability reports.
4Firms that have a broad scope of assurance, i.e., assurance on the entire sustainability report, in numbers and as a percentage of ﬁrms
that employ third parties to provide assurance on their sustainability reports.
5Firms that have reasonable assurance on their sustainability reports, in numbers and as a percentage of ﬁrms that employ third parties
to provide assurance on their sustainability reports.
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Variable Deﬁnition Data source
Sustainability report Sustainability report is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the company
issued a standalone or integrated sustainability report, with information in
at least one of the six categories from the GRI standards, and 0 otherwise.
GRIs Sustainability
Disclosure (SD)
database
SA SA is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a company’s sustainability
report was assured by an independent third party, and 0 otherwise.
GRI’s SD database
Assurance provider Assurance provider is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the assurance
provider is a member of the auditing profession, and 0 if the assurance is
not provided by an accounting ﬁrm (Simnett et al., 2009).
GRI’s SD database
Scope of assurance Scope of assurance is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the scope of
the independent assurance provided covers the entire sustainability report,
and 0 otherwise.
GRI’s SD database
Level of assurance Level of assurance is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if reasonable
assurance was provided for the sustainability report, and 0 otherwise,
i.e., limited assurance.
GRI’s SD database
CSP score The ratio of a company’s CSP score to the average CSP score of all
competing ﬁrms in the industry as deﬁned by the SIC codes (Luo et al., 2015).
A company’s CSP score is calculated as the sum of the environmental and
social performance scores provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4’s ESG
database divided by two (Cheng et al., 2014; Clarkson et al., 2015). Higher
ratios indicate a better corporate sustainability performance.
Thomson Reuters
ASSET4’s ESG
database
Dummy CSP score A dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the CSP score of a ﬁrm I in year
t was high, and 0 if the CSP score was low. The CSP score of ﬁrm i in year
t was high if this score was above the industry median, and 0 otherwise.
Stakeholder
orientation
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a company is headquartered in a more
stakeholder-oriented country, and 0 if a company is headquartered in a more
shareholder-oriented country. The distinction between stakeholder or shareholder
orientation is based on the origin of law (La Porta et al., 1997). Companies
headquartered in code law countries are considered to have a more stakeholder
orientation, whereas companies headquartered in common law countries are
considered to have a more shareholder orientation (Simnett et al., 2009).
The European countries are classiﬁed as more
stakeholder-oriented countries, except for the UK and Ireland that are
classiﬁed as more shareholder-oriented countries. The USA and Canada
are also classiﬁed as more shareholder-oriented countries.
Simnett et al.
(2009)
Lnsize Lnsize is the logarithm of the company’s year-end total assets. Datastream
ROA Measures the return on assets, calculated by dividing the net income (loss)
by the total assets.
Datastream
Leverage Leverage is measured as the total liabilities divided by the total assets. Datastream
Industry Industry is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if companies are classiﬁed as
environmentally or socially sensitive industries, and 0 otherwise
(Patten, 2002; Simnett et al., 2009).
Datastream
Rule of law Proxy developed by the World Bank that measures the extent to which agents
have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society, including the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence (Kaufmann et al., 2007; Simnett et al., 2009).
World Bank
(Kaufmann et al.,
2007)
Year dummies Year dummies control for time effects and for omitted variables that vary over
time, but are constant among ﬁrms.
Datastream
Table 2. Variable deﬁnitions
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law measure, developed by the World Bank, as a proxy for the quality of the legal environment (Kaufmann et al.,
2007).6 Finally, we included the year dummies to control for omitted variables that vary over time but are constant
among the ﬁrms.
Table 2 summarizes the deﬁnitions of the dependent, independent, and control variables employed in the ana-
lyzes. Table 3 reports the summary statistics for these variables.
Research Model
We tested the hypotheses using sequential logit models. The decisions related to SA made by a company can be
modelled as a sequence of independent binary logit models. First, companies have to decide whether to issue sus-
tainability reports. Companies that issue sustainability reports subsequently have to decide whether to have this in-
formation independently assured. Companies that decide to have their sustainability reports assured by a third party
have to make three additional choices: choice of the assurance provider, choice of scope of assurance, and choice of
level of assurance. These decisions, as well as the previous decision to issue a sustainability report, are illustrated in
the decision tree in Figure 1.
We used multilevel (panel) data regression analyses to test our hypotheses. Multilevel analysis is an appropriate
method to include explanatory variables at different levels simultaneously, i.e., at the country and ﬁrm level, and to
study interactions among these levels (Hox, 2002; Dong & Stettler, 2011). To test the hypotheses, the following mul-
tilevel logistic regression models were estimated (in Stata 14):
SA;ASSURANCE PROVIDER; SCOPE; LEVEL ¼ β0 þ β1CSP þ β2STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION
þ β3CSPSTAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION þ β4FIRMCONTROL
þ β5INDUSTRYCONTROL þ β6COUNTRYCONTROL
þ β7YEARCONTROL þ ε
where the dependent variables reﬂect the choices related to third-party assurance on sustainability reports described
above. The independent variable CSP and the control variables at the company, industry and country level are the
6The rule of law reﬂects perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society in general, and the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence in particular (Kaufmann et al.,
2009; Simnett et al., 2009).
Variable Total sample Subsamples
Stakeholder-oriented countries Shareholder-oriented countries
n Mean Std. dev. n Mean Std. dev. n Mean Std. dev.
Sustainability reporting 4686 0.67 0.47 3017 0.69 0.46 1669 0.64 0.48
External assurance 3154 0.48 0.49 2082 0.55 0.49 1072 0.34 0.47
Assurance provider 3154 0.38 0.48 2082 0.46 0.49 1072 0.21 0.41
Scope of assurance 3154 0.13 0.33 2082 0.17 0.37 1072 0.06 0.12
Level of assurance 3154 0.02 0.17 2082 0.03 0.18 1072 0.02 0.14
CSP score 3154 1.00 0.22 3017 1.00 0.39 1669 1.00 0.36
Lnsize 4686 9.44 1.75 3017 9.28 1.71 1669 10.01 1.71
ROA 4686 0.05 0.33 3017 0.05 0.41 1669 0.05 0.07
Leverage 4686 0.64 0.21 3017 0.64 0.21 1669 0.65 0.20
Industry 4686 0.30 0.46 3017 0.32 0.46 1669 0.29 0.46
Rule of Law 4686 1.47 0.59 3017 1.33 0.69 1669 1.69 0.11
Stakeholder orientation 4686 0.64 0.48 3017 1 0 1669 0 0
Table 3. Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis
See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables.
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factors that explain the variation in the third-party assurance practices. In addition, we controlled for ﬁrm and coun-
try random effects and included year dummies. To address the fact that the effects of CSP on SA-related choices
may differ depending on the stakeholder orientation, we also analyze the interaction effects between CSP and stake-
holder orientation. For this reason, we estimated models including both the direct effects of CSP and stakeholder
orientation and their interactions. To compute the interaction terms, centered versions of CSP were used. The main
effects therefore can be interpreted as average effects. In addition, the assumptions underlying the regression model
were tested for multicollinearity. Table 4 reports the Pearson correlations.
Results
Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis that examined the relation between CSP and third-party as-
surance. Model 1 indicates a positive association between CSP and the likelihood to issue a sustainability report.
Model 2 depicts the results for all sample ﬁrms that have issued a sustainability report, while Models 3–4 show
Figure 1. Decision tree with the number of observations for sequential logit analysis
1. 2 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. CSP Score 1.000
2. Lnsize 0.346* 1.000
3. ROA 0.011 0.045* 1.000
4. Leverage 0.134* 0.437* 0.092* 1.0000
5. Industry 0.023 0.418 0.031* 0.292* 1.000
6. Rule of law 0.112* 0.098* 0.018 0.021 0.110* 1.000
7. Stakeholder orientation 0.010 0.128* 0.001 0.038* 0.068* 0.306* 1.000
Table 4. Pearson correlations
*indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 2 details deﬁnitions of the variables.
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the results for the subsamples of the companies headquartered in the more stakeholder and shareholder-
oriented countries. Models 2–4 report positive and statistically signiﬁcant associations between CSP and third-
party assurance, after having controlled for variations in the use of third parties that provide assurance related
to the other factors speciﬁed in the model. Taken together, the results provide strong support for H1.
For those companies whose sustainability reports are assured by a third party, H2 predicts that companies
with a superior CSP are more likely to have their sustainability reports assured by a provider from the account-
ing profession. The results for Model 1 in both Panel A and B of Table 6 do not show statistically signiﬁcant
relations between CSP and the choice of assurance provider. However, the results in Model 2 in both Panel
A and B show signiﬁcantly positive associations between CSP and the likelihood that companies with a superior
CSP demand for an assurance provider from the auditing profession among the subsample of the companies
headquartered in the shareholder-oriented countries. On the other hand, the signiﬁcantly negative interaction ef-
fect between CSP and stakeholder orientation in Model 2 in Panel A, and the results in Model 1 of Panel B in-
dicate that there is no relation between CSP and the type of assurance provider for the companies headquartered
in stakeholder-oriented countries. Collectively, our ﬁndings provide support for H2 among the companies
headquartered in the more shareholder-oriented countries.
Panels A and B of Table 6 also show the results to test H3, which predicts that companies with a superior CSP are
more likely to choose a broader scope of assurance than companies with an inferior CSP. The results for Model 3 in
Panel A show a statistically signiﬁcant and positive association between CSP and the likelihood that companies with
a superior CSP demand for a broad scope of assurance, everything else held constant. Moreover, the signiﬁcantly
positive interaction effect between CSP and stakeholder orientation in Model 4 of Panel A and the results in Model
3 of Panel B indicate that there is a relation between CSP and the scope of assurance for the companies
headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries. However, both the results for Model 4 in Panel A and for Model
4 of Panel B do not show a statistically signiﬁcant association between CSP and the scope of assurance for the
Sample Expected
sign
Total sample Subsample of companies that issued a sustainability report
Country orientation
Stakeholder-orientation Shareholder-orientation
Model 11 Model 21 Model 3 Model 4
CSP score + 4.228*** (27.72) 2.140*** (10.42) 2.280*** (9.58) 1.724*** (4.17)
Stakeholder orientation + 1.034* (1.76) 1.302*** (2.73)
Lnsize + .195*** (5.50) .453*** (12.11) .441*** (9.72) .483*** (7.20)
ROA +/ .291 (.53) .177 (.71) .111 (.59) .179 (1.47)
Leverage +/ .671*** (2.83) 2.310*** (8.53) 2.077*** (6.12) 2.529*** (5.47)
Industry +/ .086 (.85) .377** (3.56) .383*** (3.02) .353* (1.82)
Rule of law  .243 (.76) .085 (.34) .097 (.39) .486 (.22)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random country effects Y Y Y Y
Random ﬁrm effects Y Y Y Y
Intercept 5.659*** (6.91) 6.557*** (9.34) 5.380*** (9.80) 5.722 (1.50)
N 4686 3154 2082 1072
Wald -χ2 994.89*** 391.41*** 270.67*** 122.14***
Table 5. Multilevel logistic regression results with companies’ decisions to issue sustainability reports, and whether to employ third
parties to provide assurance on sustainability reports as dependent variables
***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two tailed, z-values beneath the regression co-
efﬁcients in parentheses).
See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables.
1The models including both the direct effects of CSP and stakeholder orientation, and their interactions are not reported because the
interaction effects were positive, but not signiﬁcant.
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companies headquartered in shareholder-oriented countries. Together, these results provide support for H3 for the
companies headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries, but do not provide support for H3 for companies
headquartered in shareholder-oriented countries.
The Model 5 and 6 of both Panels A and B of Table 6 shows the results of the testing for H4, which predicts that
companies with a superior CSP are more likely to choose a higher level of assurance than companies with an
inferior CSP. However, contrary to expectations, these results reveal no statistically signiﬁcant relations between
CSP and the level of assurance, i.e., the distinction between reasonable and limited assurance. These results do
not support H4.
Panel A. Multilevel logistic regression results for choices related to SA
Dependent variable: Expected
sign
Assurance provider from
accounting profession
Scope Level
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CSP score + .298 (.78) 1.563* (1.92) .938** (2.41) .610 (.62) .0524 (.71) .-1.209 (.71)
Stakeholder orientation + 1.487*** (2.70) 1.802*** (3.09) .406 (.60) .206 (.40) .166 (.14) .626 (.51)
CSP score x Stakeholder
orientation
+ 1.579* (1.76) 1.767* (1.72) 2.052 (1.11)
Lnsize + .292*** (5.03) .286*** (4.91) .034 (.62) .032 (.58) .096 (.98) .092 (.94)
ROA +/ .138 (1.04) .136 (1.04) .136 (1.21) .135 (1.21) .016 (.03) .004 (.01)
Leverage +/ .396 (.91) .453 (1.03) .205 (.48) .158 (.37) .744 (1.04) .718 (1.00)
Industry +/ .106 (.61) .102 (.59) .228 (1.37) .225 (1.35) .452 (1.62) .449 (1.60)
Rule of law  .589** (1.98) .610** (2.04) .270 (.78) .282 (.82) .604 (1.01) .627 (1.05)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Random country effects Y Y Y Y
Random ﬁrm effects Y Y Y Y
Intercept 3.879*** (4.06) 5.340*** (4.20) 2.875** (2.79) 1.033** (.70) 5.665*** (3.00) 3.494 (1.30
N 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514
Wald -χ2 59.84*** 62.23*** 65.62*** 67.82*** 16.62 17.39
Panel B. Multilevel logistic regression results in stakeholder vs. shareholder-oriented countries for choices related to SA.
Dependent
variable:
Assurance provider from
accounting profession
Scope Level
Country
orientation:
Stakeholder-
oriented
Shareholder-
oriented
Stakeholder-
oriented
Shareholder-
oriented
Stakeholder-
oriented
Shareholder-
oriented
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CSP score .159 (.36) 2.046** (2.27) .1.070** (2.53) .326 (.27) .821 (.99) .644 (.41)
Lnsize .301*** (4.05) .285*** (2.84) .050 (.01) .209* (1.70) .026 (.24) .303 (.81)
ROA .190 (1.14) 1.464** (2.41) .193 (1.52) 1.142** (2.37) .025 (.29) .435 (.07)
Leverage .605 (1.02) 1.325* (1.88) .511* (.99) 2.395*** (2.76) .242 (.29) 3.842 (1.41)
Industry .042 (.20) .290 (.98) .380** (1.78) .167 (.04) .371 (1.11) .738 (1.06)
Rule of law .558* (1.93) 8.636*** (3.24) .290 (.81) 3.135 (.67) .655 (1.03) 14.156** (2.34)
Country
dummies
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year
dummies
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Intercept 2.331*** (2.66) 19.845*** (4.09) 3.928** (4.51) 2.745 (.34) 8.880** (3.67) 21.592* (1.81)
N 1151 363 1151 363 1151 363
Wald -χ2 41.03*** 40.64*** 81.45*** 17.63* 13.09 41.58***
Table 6. Multilevel logistic regression results with companies’ choices related to voluntary third-party assurance on sustainability reports
(SA) as dependent variables
***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two tailed, z-values beneath the regression co-
efﬁcients in parentheses).
Table 2 details deﬁnitions of the variables.
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Discussion
Interpretation
Our ﬁndings provide support for signaling theory, indicating that companies with a superior CSP are more likely to
voluntarily employ a third party to provide assurance to differentiate themselves from other companies. Signaling
theory explains these ﬁndings by suggesting that, although assurance on sustainability reports is a costly signal,
SA is beneﬁcial for companies with a good CSP, and in particular for the large companies that receive much public
attention and monitoring. The marginal expected beneﬁts of credibly signaling superior CSP, including an increase
in stakeholders’ conﬁdence in the credibility of the CSP information disclosed and an improved reputation, are
likely to outweigh the assurance costs. Additionally, the results also indicate that country-speciﬁc characteristics
are important for understanding the variation in choices related to voluntary assurance on sustainability reports.
For companies that have their sustainability reports assured, the results indicate that CSP plays a signiﬁcant role
in explaining variation in the choice of the third-party assurance provider for the companies headquartered in
shareholder-oriented countries. However, the results do not show a statistically signiﬁcant relation between CSP
and the type of assurance provider for the companies headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries. Moreover,
the descriptive statistics in Tables 1 and 3 indicate that the market for third-party assurance providers in
stakeholder-oriented countries is much larger than that in shareholder-oriented countries, which is consistent with
previous research that shows that Europe is a forerunner in the third-party assurance market (Mock et al., 2007;
Mock et al., 2013; Junior et al., 2014). In addition, and consistent with results in previous studies (Kolk & Perego,
2010; Perego & Kolk, 2012), Models 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table 6 also show signiﬁcant and positive associations
between stakeholder orientation and the demand for an assurance provider from the accounting profession, indicat-
ing that for those companies that have their reports assured, companies in stakeholder-oriented countries are more
likely to employ a professional accountant (auditor) to provide assurance than companies headquartered in
shareholder-oriented countries.
An explanation why the results do not support H2 for the companies headquartered in stakeholder-oriented coun-
tries may be that compared to the companies in shareholder-oriented countries, in stakeholder-oriented countries
companies with good and poor CSP are bothmore likely to have assurance providers from the accounting and auditing
profession (Hodge et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009; Pﬂugrath et al., 2011; KPMG, 2015). In shareholder-oriented
countries, however, the few companies that employ third parties to provide assurance from among the top tier account-
ing ﬁrms are also mainly the companies that have a superior CSP (Perego & Kolk, 2012; Mahoney et al., 2013; Casey &
Grenier, 2015). Signaling theory explains these results by suggesting that in shareholder-oriented countries, account-
ing ﬁrms add more value as assurance provider than sustainability consultants for companies with superior sustain-
ability performance. However, in stakeholder-oriented European countries it matters less whether the assurance
provider comes from an accountancy or sustainability consultancy ﬁrm. The larger assurance market in Europe that
includes multiple providers with good reputations (Mock et al., 2007; Mock et al., 2013) may be more competitive,
which reduces assurance quality differences (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005, 2007; Casey & Grenier, 2015).
These results also indicate that for companies headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries, those with a supe-
rior CSP are more likely to choose a broader assurance scope than the companies with an inferior CSP. These results
provide support for signaling theory. Signaling theory explains these results by suggesting that a broad assurance
scope is difﬁcult for inferior performers to mimic relative to a narrow scope. A broad assurance scope is also more ex-
pensive than a narrow scope, but signals more credibility and reliability of the CSP disclosures to investors and other
stakeholders than a narrow scope. The results indicate that for managers of companies in stakeholder-oriented coun-
tries with a superior CSP the marginal expected beneﬁts of signaling credible CSP information are likely to outweigh
the marginal costs of signaling. For the companies headquartered in shareholder-oriented countries, however, the re-
sults do not show a statistically signiﬁcant relation between CSP and the type of assurance scope. An explanation may
be that in shareholder-oriented countries, on average, less than 20% of the largest publicly listed companies that have
their sustainability reports assured have a broad assurance scope (Panel B in Table 1), indicating that bothmanagers of
companies with good and poor CSPs are not likely to pay for broad assurance on their sustainability reports.
Finally, the results do not show statistically signiﬁcant relations between CSP and the level of assurance. A possible
explanation for the lack of statistically signiﬁcant associations between CSP and the level of assurance is the low number
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of ﬁrms that pay for reasonable assurance on their sustainability reports. Panels A and B of Table 1 show that, on aver-
age, less than 7% of the large publicly listed companies that have their reports assured use reasonable assurance. The
ﬁndings indicate that regardless of companies’CSP, the management of companies probably does not expect to beneﬁt
from the costly reasonable assurance. An additional explanation may be that ﬁrms that provide independent assurance
may prefer to provide limited assurance (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005). They might be less willing to provide reasonable
assurance due to a lack of hard, objective, and veriﬁable reporting standards that may increase their litigation risks.
For the companies that employ third parties to provide assurance, legitimacy theory provides additional explana-
tions for the statistically signiﬁcant associations between CSP and the choice of the assurance provider for the com-
panies in shareholder-oriented countries, and CSP and the scope of assurance for the companies in the stakeholder-
oriented countries. Legitimacy theory suggests that the managers of companies with a poor CSP that are subject to
public pressures and legitimacy threats also expect to beneﬁt from SA by selectively choosing limited assurance on
speciﬁc sections of their sustainability reports. They self-servingly use third-party assurance as a tool to actively man-
age stakeholders’ perceptions of the credibility of the CSP information disclosed, facilitate perceived legitimacy and
enhance corporate reputation.
Limitations
Of course, the ﬁndings of this study must to be considered in the light of its limitations. These limitations include
variety in sustainability reporting and assurance standards, the measurement of CSP, and a potential selection bias.
Variety in reporting and assurance standards negatively affects the comparability of the quality of assurance on sus-
tainability reports. A lack of widely accepted deﬁnitions for CSP negatively affects CSP measurement as well as the
comparability of companies’ CSPmeasurements and reporting (Hrasky, 2011; Hahn et al., 2015). Moreover, in settings
in which sustainability reporting and third-party assurance practices are mainly voluntary, companies may signal and
emphasize their good CSP, whereas particularly companies with an inferior CSP can mask or do not show a poor CSP
(Boiral, 2013; Reimsbach & Hahn, 2015). This raises the issue of a self-selection bias because CSP information is avail-
able only to the extent that companies voluntarily report this information. Another limitation, which is also related to
data availability, is that the sample ﬁrms included in this study were large, publicly listed companies that have resources
available to invest in sustainability reporting and third-party assurance. However, smaller companies that publish sus-
tainability reports, with or without third-party assurance, and companies in less developed market economies were not
considered. Future research could include an even broader ﬁrm sample to increase insight into the external validity of
the ﬁndings. Further research could also beneﬁt from a future mandatory regulation of sustainability reporting and
third-party assurance resulting in improved data reliability, comparability, and veriﬁability.
Conclusion
This study explored the relation between CSP and the variation in choices related to voluntary third-party assurance
on sustainability reports for companies in stakeholder- and shareholder-oriented countries in Europe and North
America. For this reason, a distinction was made between companies that issue sustainability reports with and with-
out third-party assurance and for those whose sustainability reports are assured, in the choice of the assurance pro-
vider, the scope of assurance and the level of assurance. The results show that companies with better CSP are more
likely to employ an independent third party to provide assurance on their sustainability reports than companies with
inferior sustainability performance, after having controlled for the other factors speciﬁed in the model. Additionally,
the results also indicate that country-speciﬁc characteristics are important for understanding the variation in choices
related to voluntary assurance on sustainability reports. For the companies that employ third parties to provide as-
surance, we also ﬁnd that, among the companies headquartered in the more shareholder-oriented countries, CSP
plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining variation in the choice of the assurance provider, while predominantly in the
more stakeholder-oriented countries, companies with a good CSP are more likely to choose a broader assurance
scope than companies with a poor CSP. Signalling theory explains these ﬁndings by suggesting that, in settings
in which SA is voluntary, the expected beneﬁts of SA practices will more likely outweigh the assurance costs for
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superior performing companies than for those with poorer CSP. In addition, companies with superior performance
are more likely to make SA-related choices that are hard to replicate by companies with inferior CSP. At the same
time, legitimacy theory explains that the companies with poor CSP that are subject to public pressures and legiti-
macy threats may also beneﬁt from SA by choosing for limited assurance on speciﬁc sections of their sustainability
reports to signal the credibility of their CSP released.
Overall, the ﬁndings have important implications for corporate practice, most importantly, the management of
CSR reporting ﬁrms, as well as for standard-setters and regulators. The results imply that, conditional upon the
stakeholder orientation, managers of companies with a superior CSP may voluntarily employ third-parties to
provide assurance to signal that the CSP information is fairly presented and free of material misstatements. SA sig-
nals the credibility of their CSP disclosures and enhances conﬁdence in accuracy and reliability of the information
disclosed. However, due to managerial capture managers of companies with an inferior CSP may also utilize SA as a
risk management tool to proactively manage stakeholders’ perceptions of the credibility of the CSP information
revealed and deﬂect attention from bad sustainability performance. The ﬁndings therefore suggest a need to com-
plement voluntary third-party assurance with mandatory requirements for sustainability reporting and assurance
practices comparable with mandatory ﬁnancial reporting systems.7 A stricter reporting and assurance regime may
urge companies, and in particular the companies with an inferior CSP, to provide more complete and balanced
information about their CSP, and increase comparability of companies’ performance information in their sustain-
ability reports at the national and international levels. In addition, a stricter application of assurance by independent
third parties may reduce managers’ opportunistic use of third-party assurance as a tool for reducing legitimacy risks,
thus enhancing overall conﬁdence in the credibility of sustainability reporting and assurance practices. This will also
help make companies more accountable for their CSP.
Finally, this study explored the role of CSP in explaining the variation in choices related to SA in an international
setting. However, the process of third-party assurance may also positively affect corporate accountability on sustainabil-
ity, while a higher quality of corporate disclosures on CSPmay drive the development of sustainable business practices
and the creation of sustainable values. Overall, more research is needed on both the drivers and consequences of third-
party assurance to advance our understanding of conditions that facilitate or inhibit stakeholder conﬁdence in corporate
sustainability disclosures in general and in the credibility of reported CSP information in particular.
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